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Opinlon of the Project Board of  Europe Plt
In accordance with paragraPh 2 of  its  Terms of Reference where it  is
the Conrnission an opinion on the final scated I'The Board shall  give
report of the Teamfrt
Noting the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of  14 January 1974
where it  is  stated:  trThe Council takes note of  the fact  ....  that the
Corunission intends to submit specific proposals in the near future
on the basis of the results of the preliminary prograrunerr:
Noting that the preliminary progiranme concerned  has been carried out
by the Europe Plus Thirty Project Team during L974 and 1975 and that
lts  results are the report of  the Project Team:
Having advised the Project Director on the method and progress of  the
work, in accordance with Para. 3 of  its  Terms of Reference, having been
anare of the progress of  the work at all  stages and having contributed
thereto:
Having carefully considered t,he Report of the Project Team submitted
by the Project Director:
The Project Board transmits the following opinion thereon to the
Corunission of  the European Comtrunities.
l)  The report constitutes a valuable set of  recommendations to the
Corunission in anSwer to the questions contained:-in  the Annex
to the above mentioned Council Resolution.
2)  The Board endorses  unanirnously  the basic philosophy of  the Report,
stressing the need for a fonrard looking view and indicating the
possibilities  for a systenutic and rational  approach to it
at  Comounity level.  This does not mean that every member
agrees rilith all  aspects of  the Report:  constructive criticismt
partLy of a technical nature, wiLl constitute an important inPut
to the future work to be undertaken.
3)  The Board is  unanimous in approving the recommendation  of  the
Report that a continuing  instrument rrEurope Plus Thirtytt should
be set up and that it  should gradually build uP to the optimum
staff  leveI.4) Given the present period of rapid evolution which demands that
political  decisions be taken on the basis of comprehensive
lntegrated forecasting studies, the Board stresses to  the
Commission  the urgency of  this  mattex.
S igned :  Lord Kennet
:  Prof.  N. Rasmussen
Project Board Members:
Chairman of  the Project Board
and Project Director
:  Chairman ad interim of  the Project
Board for  the purpose of
formulating the above opinion.
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Professor Dr. H.B.G. Casimir
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Professor Bertrand de Jouvenel
Dr. Alexander King
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Dr. Max Kohnstannn
Mr. K. Pavitt
Professor P. Piganiol
Professor I.  Prigogine
Senator Mary Robinson
Professor R. Saint-Paul
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MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS  OF THE REPORT
We recommend that:
f)  A long-term forecasting instrument, Europe Plus Thirty,  should be
set up to serve the institutions  of  the European Conrnunity and, so
far as the latter  may desire, its  member governrnents.  It  should
work to a time horizon of  5 years and longer.
2)  Technology  Assessment  should be carried out by the continuing
instrumenL Europe Plus Thirty'  as an integral part of  its  work.
3)  The forecasting should be integrated,  by which we mean two
things:
(a) llot  limited to a single sector, but encompassing and
integrating al1 sectors relevant  to the long-term
future of  the European Communities, or to the particular
problem area under examination.
(b) Integrated with the Communitiesi policy-making  process.
4)  The forecasting should be so devised that a range of possible
goals and possible ways to reach them can be examined.  No
one goal or policy would be  recommended above others.
5)  Europe Plus Thirty  should adopt a flexible  andadaptive  method
of work, employing a wide range of quantitative and non-
quantitative  methods.
6)  It  should work in  three ways: by assembling and integrating work
done elsewhere, by lettlng  contracts, and by in-house research.
7)  Europe Plus Thirty  should have, as well as "generalists",  an
in-house staff  with knowledge of  the following subjects:-
Agriculture, fisheries  and forestries
SociaI structures and values
Edircation
Science and TechnologY
Industry
Energy
Materials
Environment
Transport
Economics  & Finance
Defence & Disarmament
Politics  & Institutions
TechnologY  Assessmentvii
8)
e)
For the following subjects Europe plus Thirty  should primariry
rely  on outside advice:-
CI imate
Populatlon
HeaI th
Communlca tlons
a)  The- governing body of Europe plus Thirty  should be a Board of  12
members, appointed by the Conrnission of  the European Corrnunities.
b)  The staff  of Europe plus Thirty  should be headed by a director
assisted by two deputy directors.
c)  The staff  should be gradually built  up to 75 graduate
professionals.
d)
e)
Publication of work should be the rule,  but unpublished
studies should not be excluded if  there is  good reason.
Europe Plus Thirty  should be at  the service of  the
European Commission  and Parliament,  and a1so, if  they
wish it,  of  the member governments.  The relationship
of Europe Plus Thirty  to the institutions  of  the Community
should be kept permanently  under review by the Board of
Europe Plus Thirty.
f)  At least 75L of Europe Plus Thirty's  finance should come
from the Commission of  the European Cormnunities.4.
GENEML INTRODUCTION
FORECASTING FOR EUROPE
Gen. 1.  The need for  forecasting as an aid to wise  decision-making is  not
new, nor is  it  peculiar to any one country or culture.  But systematic
forecasting for  the medium and longer-term is  an especially urgent need
for  the European Community now.
Gen. 2.  The pace of change and the uncertainty of  its  direction have made
forecasting  more than ever  necessary, to anticipate change, to prePare
contingency plans, to take out insurance policies  against various dangers,
and to help in moulding the future as far  as one can.  The Conuuunity in
particular,  being established in  response to great changes in  the
European and international  environment of  the member states, must avail
itself  of  the best possible forecasts if  it  is  to respond
appropriately to continuing changes.
Gen.3. Some of  the most important problems confronting us (think,  for
example, Of energyr or of the international monetary system, or of  the
relations between developed and developing countries) cut right  across
tradltional  sectoral responsibilities  and areas of  thought.  Hence the
need for  systematic and integrated forecasting.
Gen.4. The world is  bursting in on us.  Because of modern economict
technological  and political  developments, it  is world forces and world
factors which shape our European lives,  and sometimes threaten  them.
Comparing the period between 1914 and 1944 with the recent past'  it
is  clear that Europe is no longer the originator  of  impulses that change
and affect  the rest of  the world, and is  more and mqre becomiag the
receiving end, as witness the energy crisis.  By actirrg together,  the
European countries have a better chance of once again exerting an
inflsence on world events
Gen.S.  Forecastlng should be an aid to decision-making.  The good
prophet is not  he who is  always right,  but he who is  proved wrong
by events because his warnings were taken seriously and acted upon
by people, who thereby prevented  what was feared.  Cassandra was
always right,  only because she was always disbelieved.  The good
prophet does not say, as Cassandra did:  "The city  will  be taken and
sacked".  This leads either  to disbelief  or defeatism, and the
city  wi.Il be taken and sacked.  The good prophet says:  "If  we do2-
nothing, the ctty  will  be taken and sacked.  on the other hand, tf
we do thls,  Lhat or the other, it  will  not --  itrs  up to us"'  To
perform hls function, therefore, the good prophet must be aware of
politlcal  realities,  and enjoy the attention and confidence of  the
pol lcy-makers .
Gen. 6.  It  is  clear that there is  no point in  forecasting except to
help decision, and that one cannot rationally  decide without forecasts'
But the two processes are different  in nature, and they should be and
are done by different  people.  The forecasters will  concentrate  uPon
those longer-term issues which tend to be squeezed out by the immediate
pressures of politics  and government. But they must not advise the
decision-makers  what to do:  they must only point out the probable
effects of various alternative  courses of action.  To go further  and
to urge this  or that is  to step outside forecasting into  the field
of policY.
Gen. 7.  llhat sort of forecasting, then, will  be useful to those we elect
to rule us, in  their  decision-making Process ?  one rnay deploy in
onets mind an image of  the future as a cone.  'The further we Look
ahead, the wider is  the range of possibilities  -  the cone exPands
outwards.  Tomorrow will  probably be pretty  like  today, the day after
tomorror^l less like.  The further  one looks ahead, the wider the
posslbilities  become. 0utside the cone lies  the impossible.  Inside
it  lie  all  the things which might happen'
Gen. 8.  The range of possibilities  becomes very broad if  one casts onets
mind,say,twentyorthirtyyearsintothefuture.Thejobof
conununity forecasters  should be to focus on those possible future
conditions of European society (including its  relations with the rest
of  the world) which'are rationally  conceivable, i.e.  which couldt
without flying  in  the face of  reason, be adopted as goals.
Gen. g.  The attairunent of  goals requires the adoption of policies.  The
greater the period of  time that is  allowed for  the achievement of  a
particular  goal, the  wider is  the choice of alternative policies  and
means which can be used to attain  the goal.  With a given goal to be
attained at a given point in  time, the nearer lde move towards it  (the
longer we delay action),  the narrower becomes the range of possible
policies and instruments.  One can visualise another cone, but
expanding towards us this  time.  Thus we have two cones running in
opposiLe directions,  the goal-choice cone with its  apex now and itsbase in the future, and
Its  apex ln the future.
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The future ls  regarded as ao ever widenlng Cone of possible sl-tuations.  (Cone
of @!..1@!gg).  Everything lnslde the Cone ABC ts consldered to be possible'
and everythlng outside lmpossible.  Ttre polnts C30lI, C3012 and G30/3 lte
wlthin the bounds of posslblllty.  The dlstinctlon and descrlptlon of  these
alternative goals constitutes  the first  part of a teleonomy.
Suppose that point or situation  G3012 ls  chosen as a goal for  the
Comrnunity. Then the Cone of Heans Choice (dotted cone M30/I -  G3012 - M30/2),
w1thitsaPexatgoa|G30|2,ffiitisprojectedbacktothesituation
today, showing the range of posslble means open to our choice now, and also the
narrowlng of the Cone as time advances. The distinction and description of  these
means constitutes the second part of a tetreonomy.
If  a l5-year goal (GL5l2) is selected, the range of means to attain it  is
smaller than in the case of the more distant goal - G3Ol2. (Cone H15/L '  Cl5l2 '
r4L5 | 2)
As emphasised in the main text,  this concePt is just  that:  a 94r  a
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Gen. 10.  One of the maln products of Europe Plue Ttrlrty could be the
descrlptlon of a number of alternatlve  goals to be reached trn the
futurer say ln thirty yearst tlme, or less.  Ttre incompatibtlttles
between these goals would be set out, and the costs and benefits of
each described. The beneflts would be ln terms of soclal goods or
values apparent to all  at the tlme of judgementr  such as justice,
harmony, quallty of life,  real wealth, etc. (none of wtrich, lt  is
worth notlng, is strictly  quantlflable).  Ttre Purpose would be to
facilltate  the cholce by European declslon-makers of goals and of
policles to reach them.
Cen. ll.  Many of  the partlcular  techniques of forecasting orlginated
ln  the U.S.  It  is  right  to remember that although  the "scientific"
competence of  the American thinktanks was often high, it  was not
always matched by their  polltical,  historical  and philosophical
competence, The mistakes made there must not be repeated here.
Forecastlng  should by no means be confined to elaboration of  that
whlch can be expressed numerically, however skillfully  that may be
done.  It  must also keep a firm and distinct  hold of politlcal  and
soclal reality,  and any forecasting team must include peopLe with
experience, preferably dlrect,  of politics.  ltre academic
quantltative approach often meets with "surprises" --  with qualitative
breaks ln quantitative curves,  But those skilled  in human affairs  and
politics  tend to find  fewer surprises in  life,  and to feel  that anyone
who ls  surprised was not looking.  They know that  the haves hold on
and the have-nots reach to grasp;  that the traduced protest,  the
oppressed  rise up;  that the weaPon used is  that closest at hand;
that ignorance will  not endure;  that change is  joy  to the young and
grief  to the old;  and many other things of  that sort.  If  the
forecasts produced by quantitative methods go agalnst some of  this
knowledge, then they must be reconsidered.-)-
Gen. L2.  Throughout the report we hope that the reader will  remember  our
general purpose: to devise a new instrument  which will  help the power
centres of  the European Communitles to make wise decisions in a largely
but not wholly uncontrollable worId.
Gen. 13.  The instrument will  cost something, and hard-headed  people will
think of  the economic crisis,  of  inflation,  of  "runaway public expenditure",
of  the proliferation  of  institut.ions,  etc.  But it  is  precisely to reduce
the likelihood of  these that Europe Plus Thirty  would be set up.  It  would
exist,  among other things, to foresee crises,  to forecast about the under-
lying causes of  inflation,  and generally to reduce the uncertainty of  the
future.  rt  is  short views which have landed us in our present
difficulties,  and now is  the time for  longer views.  It  would be paradoxical
if  the Cosrnunity were to judge itself  already too ill  to reach for  the
medicine.
PART I  : CAPACITY AND PROCESS
Chapter 1.  Existing, Forecasting  at  the level of  the European Communities
I.1.I.  By its  nature, the European Connnunity depends on long-term forecasts
to a greater extent than nation states.  It  has itself  developed, and
will  continue to develop, in  response to the changing requirements of  the
member countries.  Forecasting is  needed to anticipate these changing
requirements and to prepare alternative policies  to meet them.  The
increasing interweaving  of  the economies of  the member states also calls
for  the European dimension in forecasting;  indeed there is  now very
little  long-term forecasting that a member state can do by it.self.
T.L.2.  Conrnunity-wide  research on the future can contribute to goal-
seeking for  the further  development of European integration,  (or  indeed
for  a standstill  where we are) and to set out options in various fields
of European policy.
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1.3.  Though it  is  the Council which sets new goals for  the Community,
the Commission plays a significant  part in  the goal-seeking Process as
the turntable around which the Community network of communications ls
organised,  Now that many of  the goals of  the original  Treaties have
been largely achieved, there is  a certain lack of  impetus and direction;
the Conrnunity, and in particular  the Commission,  stands in need of  the
long-term integrated forecasting  which could help it  to set new goals.
I.I.4.  The main Report includes a list
have so far  been undertaken by or for
of  the Commission. They concentrate
the forecasts and studies which
various Directorates-General
the short and medium-term, and
of
the
on
limit  themselves to individual sectors.  The shortcomings  of  the forecastst
due to factors such as the incomparability of national statistics,  the
limitations  of  traditional  sectoral forecasting  methods, and Lhe high level
of aggregation,  have often been compounded by dlfficulties  at  the receiving
end:  over-rigid division between the Directorates-General,  a lack of
interdepartmental coordination, and a lack of central planning within  the
Commiss ion.
I.1.5.  How should Europe Plus Thirty  fit  into  the picture ?  A general
principle  for  Ehe interface can be found in  the time-horizon of  the
work concerned.  Where existing sectoral forecasting is  realIy  short-
term, a mutual flow of  information would be sufficient.  Where the
sectoral work is medium-termt ranging from one to four years, the
coordination should be more thorough, involving some harmonisation
of methods and the adoption of  some corunon assumptions. Where a time-
horizon of more than four years is  involved, the projects in  question
should become part of Europe Plus Thirty.  The work could well continue
Eo be done by the same people, even in  the same place, but as part of
the more lntegrated network of  the Europe Plus Thirty project as it  is
described below.  With a time-horizon longer than four or five  years,
single-sector forecasting is  very little  use, since al1 the sectors start
depending on one another.
Chapter -2.  Foreca.sting Capacity in  the European Cormnunities
1.2.I.  In the last  ten years, there has been an increase in  the amount of
forecasting in  the world at  large, both in  governments and in  lndustry
(particularly  in  the multinational corporations).  The pattern of  fore-
casting in EEC countries and elsewhere, and the organisations  involved in
forecasting  in  Conrnunity and neighbouring countries, are described in7-
detail  in an Annex Eo the main Report.  By and large the pattern in  the
Community countries lies  between the poles of deterministic  centralism,
as in  the Soviet Unionrand variegated private initiatives,  as in  the U.S.
It  is  difficult  to make any generalisation,  given the great variety  in  the
purpose and methods of approach.  Moreover, the pattern is  changing alt
the time,  Europe Plus Thirty  could perform a useful subsidiary function
by monitoring what is  happening in  the field,  and by helping to devise
more satisfactory forecasting procedures.
Chapter 3.  The Forecasting  Process
I.3.I.  The forecasting process itself  can be analysed into  three components:
the inputs, the methods or techniques, and the use of  the results.
T.3.2.  The inputs consist of  information.  It  can be historical  data,
knowledge of  the present situation,  technical laws, political  plans,
etc.  Often, a forecast has to rely  on other forecasts to provide it
with assumptions regarding  what will  be, from its  point of view,
independent or exogenous  variables.  Structural economic data, non-
economic or social factors,  and trends and developments  in other parts
of  the world are all  as important as the more familiar  statistical  time-
series inputs.
I.3.3.  Europe Plus Thirty must decide what sort of data it  needs, and
obtain them.  It  will  have to negotiate for  the data with the Community
Statistical  Office,  the national statistical  services, and other bodies.
The use of social indicators must be developed.  Europe Plus Thirty will
also need to enter into working arrangements  with the most relevant
institutions  to get the world perspective which is  indispensable  for
assessing Europet s future.
1.3.4,  Forecasting techniques can be classified  by the three main purposes
they serve:  projection of  the past and present into the future,  image
creation or visualisation  of possible future states, and policy analysis.
The following methods are described in  the main Report:-
single-variable extrapolation  (projection)
envelope curves (pro3ection)
analysis by precursive events (projection)
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scenarios  (image creation and projection)
Delphi (image creation and projection)
brainstorming ( image creation)
morphology (image creation and policy analysis)
relevance tree (policy analysis)
cost benefit analysis (policy analysis)
planning, progranrning  and budgeting system (policy  analysis)
network methods (policy analysis)
decision theory (policy analysis)
goal setting and weighting (policy  analysis)
value analysis (policy analysis)
conflict  analysis (policy analysis)
graph theory (projection and policy analysis)
Markov chains (projection)
game theory (projection and poticy analysis)
cross-impact  (projection and policy analysis)
input-output relatioaships (projection)
mul tivariate  analysis (projection)
mathematical  mode lling  ( projection)
computer simulation models (proiection and policy analysis)
stochastlc  methods (projection)
gaming models (projection and image creation)
optimisation techniques (projection and policy analysis)
Some of  these are held to be useful,  some virtually  useless, some
interesting but dangerousr and many in between.
I.3.5.  Many of  these techniques were devised for  engineering and military
problems.  In the .social sciences the scope for  quantitative methods
is'very  lirnited.  Europe Plus ThirLy shoutd adopt a flexible  and adaptive
approach to forecasting,  employing a whole range of quantitative and non-
quantitative  methods, rather than airning at once to construct an elaborate
socio-economic  model of Europe.  The choice of  techniques must dependt
among other thi-ngs, oa the kind of  issues and the PurPose for which the
forecast is  intended.
I.3.6.  The most fruitful  use of  forecasting requires a continuous dialogue
between the forecasters  and their  clients.  Without direct  access for
the forecaster  to the decision-maker  himself,  the whole operation is
bound to be accident-irone.-  9-
I.3.7.  Interaction between forecasters and policy-makers is  needed at  a
number of points in  the policy-making process:
(f)  when the defects of current policies  begin to appear,
ln order to explore the long-term future context in which
new policies will  take effect,
(ii)  when policy change is  being considered, to evaluate the
costs and benefits of alternative  new policies,
(iii)  when policy  is  being implemented, so that the forecasters
can check the accuracy of  their  forecasts and learn from
the experience gained during implementation.
I.3.8.  The conrnunication system between Europe Plus Thirty  and the
Connnission must be designed so that:
(i)  information is  exchanged at all  relevant levels,
( ii)  the links  at each level are as short as possible,
(ifi)  the producers and recipients of  forecasts have direct
access to each other at all  these levels.
Chapter 4.  Igtegrgting Forecasti_49_a! the level of  the European Communities
I.4.1.  Community forecasting can be arrived at in  two ways.  National
sectoral forecasts can be combined into either  EEC sectoral forecasts
or lnto national comprehensive  forecasts, and EEC comprehensive  forecasts
can be based either on EEC sectoral forecasts or on national comprehensive
forecasts.  Given that  the Communities have their  own sect.oral policies,
the route via EEC sectoral forecasts is  the more useful for  its  purposes,
but the other route can provide a useful check.
1.4,2.  To make integrated long-term forecasting as useful as possible to
the Communities, certain fundamental changes going on in  the world need
to be borne in mind.
T.4.3.  The expectation of social relevance
There is  growing insistence in Western Europe that public policies
should make a real difference to people's conditions in a direct,
tangible way.  This means that policy-makers  increasingly need to think
in  terms of  the results of policies  rather than the amount of money
Put into  them, and that the results have to be stated in non-monetary terms
(probably using social indicators).  For example, you cannot measure the-i0
health of a population by the amount of money spent on it;  you have to
use actual health lndicators.
I.4.4.  The drive for  greater equalitv
Emphasis is  shifting  from the averaged  outcomes of policies,  to  the
actual distribution  of costs and benefits among various nationsr grouPs
and areas.  Before major new policies  are introduced at EEC level,  Europe
plus Thirty could assess the likely  distribution  of  their  impacts.
I.4.5.  The svstemic character of social issues
Forecasting should aim to show the interactions amoag policies,
and their  intended and unintended effects on any grouP of people.  Some
of  lhe most important issues cannot be expressed in cash terms.
T.4.6.  The perception of  the world as a svstem
More and more factors and impacts outside Europe need to be taken
into consideration.
T.4.7.  Discorrtinuities  in  social evolution
Discontinuities in  technology, social custom, culture,  etc. r  seem
to be another key attribute  of  the current period.  Discontinuities catch
people by surprise because they have yet to adjust their  thinking to a
faster pace of change.  ttFutures of  researchtt  can help to understand
incipient  trends to anticipate "surprises", and thus permit the formulation
of wiser policies.
Emohasis and Driorities
I.4.8.  Studies can be of  the past or of  the future (the future grows out
qf  the past);  of processes or policies  (processes are what other people
do, policies are what you do);  and of  the European Conrnunlty or  the
outside world.  This gives us eight possible orientations:
PAST  FUTURE
Iotra-Conrnunity  Outer World  Inter-Conrnunity  Outer World
Processes  ( 1)  Q)  ( 3)  ( 4)
Community policies  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)-  It
(1)  :  Social and other monitoring, in welfare terms where possible'
within  the CormnunitY.
(2)  :  Worldwide monitoring .
(3)  :  Exploratory facet of  forecasting. 
-)
-  ..  I  Mainly Cone of Goal-Choice (4)  :  Contextual  exploratory forecastingJ
(5)  :  Ex post facto evaluation of  internal policies .
(6)  :  Ex post facto evaluation of external policies .
(7) and (8)  :  Policy analysis proper, combining goal definitior!
impact assessment, and means choice.  ttTeleonomy" as a whole.
T.4.9.  Although Europe Plus Thirty  cannot neglect any of  the cells,  we
suggest the following order of priority  for  concentrated work:
(7) and (8)  :  should be given most attention.
(1),  (3),  (a) and (5)  :  backing and context for  (7) and (8)'
(2)  :  too vast for  sYstematic studY.
(6)  !  too recent to be assessed Yet.-12-
PART II :  FIEIJDS  FOR FORECASTING
chtpter 1.  !rr!rocluci:ory
II.1.1.  Although our emphasis is  on integrated forecastinP' the logic of
exposition requires that we now consider the various fields  of  forecastins
separately.  The linkages between the sectors are illustrated  in  the
followine rnaLrix:
MATRIX
2ts
14.F;zz z&icztsHH o Ht-.Ord
ltl  F  F-l
ts
t5H-lH(J HOr& JO(j)rtlOo()Zz (,4 (Act ive )
(Passive)
CLIMATE
POPUIATION
AGRlCULTURE
HEALTH
SOClETY
EDUCATION
SC. & TECH.
INDUSTRY
ENERGY
MATERIALS
ENVIRONMENT
TRANSPORT
COMMUNICATIONS
ECON. & FIN.
DEFENCE
POLIT. & TNST.
2 3 4  s6 7  8  9101112L3L4  151617
2
J
4
5
6
7
I
9
10
11
L2
t3
I4
15
16
l7
The matrix is  intended to show the
tractivert sectors along the top on
%  :  strong impact.
:  negligible.
probable impact of  changes
t-he trpassiverr sectors down
in  the
the left  hand
impact. de.
il
si tE  moderate13
The order of  the following paragraphs is  arbitrary,  which simpty reflects
the main truth  about integrated forecasting;  everything depends  on
everything else,  therefore it  does not matter where you begin.
The rnain Report gives three example.s of how particular  forecasting
exercises of a partly  integrated sort (ttrat  is,  more than sectoral, but
less than "teleonomictt)  might be undertaken  in  response to a Comrnunity
demand.
Chapter 2.  Climate
IT.2.  It  is  all  too easy to take climati.c conditions for  granted and
to forget that our lives  can be greatly influenced by relati.vely small
changes in  the climater e.g.  through food shortages in particul-ar areas.
Between 1920 and 1960 climatic  conditions were "good", but this was in
fact an abnormal period in  comparison with the previous five  or six
centuries, and there are signs that we are now returning to the conditions
of  the late  19th Century, with more frequent ttanomalies" and "worse"
wea ther.
An urgent task is  to use models of  the interacLion between
atmosphere, oceanr ice and earth to describe the possible effects of
unpredictable natural e.rents (including volcanic eruptions,
fluctuations in  the sunrs radiation,  fluctuations of  the Antarctic ice,
etc.)  and of  the inadvertent or intentional  impacts of man on the climatic
system (including air  porrution,  supersonic transport, irrigaEion projects,
river-reversal,  etc. )
Given that all  this  is  a world job,  Europe Plus Thirty will  not need
to do much forecasting in  the field.  rt  should monitor developments
elsewhere, and encourage useful studies.  It  will  need to be able to call
on the services of one or two climatologists or agrometeorologist.s  with a
good awareness of climatic history  and of climate-harvest  relations.
Chapter 3.  Population
II.3.  Any forecasting that is  for  human beings must take account of  the
number of people one is  planning and forecasting for,  and of  the composition14
and characteristics of  the population.  Demographic forecasts are a
necessary input in general social,  economic or technological forecastingt
and we need to know more about the structure of  the present populationt
and the factors that determine mortality,  fertility  and migration.
The Corununity might in  future be led, perhaps in  the case of migrationt
to establish its  own Policy.
Europe Plus Thirty  should be able to call  on the part-time services
of one or two skilled  demographers.  The main work is  aLready being done
elsewhere, and it  will  be enough if  Europe Plus Thirty  can make good use
of  it.  It  should explore the inter-relations  between population  and
policy in various sectors at comnunlty level.  In  time, it  may be led
to make its  own forecasts, since there are many socio-economic  regionS
in Europe that straddle national frontiers.
Chapter 4.  Agriculture.  fisheries  and forestrv
II.4.  The Common Agrieultural Policy was developed for  Purposes which
have perhaps become less urgent over tbe years, and it  takes little
account of  its  own effects on the rest of  the world.  The famous beef
and butter mountains are evidence enough that forecasting in  thls  fteld
has been defectlve.  Meanwhile, the mechanisation  of agriculture makes
It  vulnerable to possible shortages of energy and raw materials.  There
ls  also a growing demand for  "naturaltt products and a growlng concern
about the environmental and ecological effects of modern agriculture.
The establishment  in  international law of Exclusive Economic Zones
w111 enable coastal governments to manage the fisheries  off  their  shores
effectlvely,  with a consequent need for  Cornnunity policy  in Western
Euro.pean r,raters.
Policy-oriented forecasting in  these sectors will  reguire
substantial analytical  research.  The appropriate  team within Europe
Plus Thirty might be about seven people.  They should cooperate  with
the FAO, OECD, the proposed new Food Policy Research Institute  in
Washington, and other institutioqs  within  and outside the Conrnunity.-15
Chapter 5.  Health
II.5.  The cost of health care has escalated in  recent years so that
priorities  will  have to be related more rigorously in  the future.
There is  small inrnediate likelihood of new improvements on the scale of,
for  example, penicillin.  Progress is  more likely  in  the prevention of
accidents, the prevention and better  treatment of cancer, the better
management of mental illness,  and the control of chemicals in water,
the air,  food, drugs and factories.  This calls  above all  for  changes
in  rifestyles  and habirs (e.g.  smoking, drinking and fast  driving).
The main need of Conrnunity countries is  fuller  exchange of
information  rather than adjustment to a single pattern.  For Europe
Plus Thirty,  the best solution would be the part-time appointment of
one or more senior medical scientists  who would be able to maintain
professional contacts over a wide range.
Chapter 6.  SociaL Structures and Values
II.6.  Specific areas that need exploring and spectulating about are:
the ageing of  the population, the problem of  commitment to workr to
the nation state, beliefs,  values, the family, minorities,  worker
participation  in  the control of enterprises,  and the changing function
of  trade unions.  Europe Plus Thirty  should include 6-8 people who could
lcork in  some of these areas, and who would supply social data, develop
the nascent practice of social forecasting, and ensure that the work of
Europe PIus Thirty  as a whole keeps sight of social realities.  Special
contacts with the trade unions will  be needed here.
Chapter 7.  Education
II.7.  Europe Plus Thirty  should address itself  to institutional  developments
within  the educational system in order to identify  changes that would be
necessary to meet possible changes in European society, and conversely, the
changes in  society that are likely  to result  from present or foreseeable
structures and contents of education.  The content of curricula  deserves
study and international comparison.  There should be continuous secondary
collection of  data and information  on enrolment, trends in  labour markets,
changing preferences, etc.  Europe PIus Thirty  should probably not include-  16
more than two professionals  in  this  area, but should set up a panel cif
experts to obtain injections of new ideas.  Forecasting in  education
will  have Eo remain mostly national,  though the internal migration of
teachers and taught wlthin  the Comnunity demands some international
forecastlngr as does the Brain Drain running from poorer to richer
countries all  over the world.
Chapter 8.  Science & Technologv
II.8.  As a research and forecasting back-up to CREST (European Cosmittee
on Scientific  and Technological  Research), Europe Plus Thirty  could
enqulre into efto has benefited from science and technologyr what sort
of R & D is  therefore likely  in  future to benefit what sort of people,
and the likely  effects of given sorts of R & D being undertaken  by
individual member states, by the European Communities as such, or on a
world basis.  Although radical advances in basic science are difficult
-  some would say impossible -  to tell  in  advance, technology (the
application of  science to industry,  the economy and society) is  much more
susceptible to forecasting.  As an input to its  social and economic fore-
casting, Europe Plus Thirty  should concentrate on those technological
developments which are both probable and likely  to have a profound
influence on society.  Examples of  these at Present include:  civil
thermonuclear fusion, harnessing solar energyr and splitting  water to
release hydrogen; cheap ways of  synthesising food;  and the laser.
Technological forecasting is,  of course, being undertaken by private firms
all  the time;  what is  lacking is  such forecasting undertaken  for  the benefit
of  socletY at  large.
Europe plus Thirty  should also try  to evaluate the way in which the
demands of society will  make themselves felt  on the scientific  system,
and the effects of different  regimes of  government and Conrnunity subsidy
and taxation on the innovative process.
Tocarryouttheabovetasks,EuropePlusThirtyshouldincludenot
less that five  to seven specialists.  They should be headed by, or should
at  least be able to call  on the services of  two people, one each in  the
physical and life  sciences, whose standing allows them access to research
at  the frontiers  of knowledge. There should be extensive use of  task
forces, short appointments and contract work'L7
Chapter 9.  Industrv
rr.9.  vertical  forecasting (about single industrles or groups of
industries) should be directed towards certain high-technology industries
and some of  the main-Iine industries.  Horizontal issues (conrnon to all
or most industries) for  forecasting should include:
the regional distribution  of  industry,
labour, capital  and energy intensities,
technology transfer and the choice of  technologies,
world division of  labour,
participation  in  the control of enterprises,
the relations between manufacturing industry and the
service sector,
mul tinational  companies,
large and small firms,
the humanisation  of work in  industry.
Europe Plus Thirty  should include about 10 people, having among them
experience of  industrial  policl  R & D policy,  industrial  management,
industrial  economics, trade unions  and consumer associations.  The same
people should (among others) also work on technology assessment.  Europe
Plus Thirty  should organise taskforces which would include people from
industry itself,  who are concerned with technology transfer and technology
assessment, and possibly from other bodies involved in  the same activity.
There should be strong trade union participation  in  this  work, and the
forecasting should be focused on areas where a Community policy  is or may
be developing.
Chapter 10. Energv
II.I0.  Large numbers of energy studies are now being undertaken.  Many of
them, however, suffer  from a number of  defects which make them inadequate
for  long-term forecasting and policy-making.  They are often ov€r-
specialised, concentrating on a specific  fuel  and ignoring the inter-
actions between energy and general socio-economic  issues.  Crude correlations
are too often used, and assumptions are made on highly controversial  issues.
The time-horizon is  often short to medium-term. Most extrapolate from
the present without fully  appreciating the very wide range of alternatives
that could be realised 30 years ahead.18
Europe Plus Thirty should emphasise the long-tetm, the inter-
connectlons between energy and socio-economic-politlcal questionst
includlng such fields as agrlculture, and the alternative options and
goals.  Thts work would involve tlistening postr actlvlties,
contracting  work out, in-house studies, and close collaboration  with
,other sections within Europe Plus Thirty.  The "energy section" in
Europe PIus Thirty would need 6-8 qualified people.
Chapter 11. Material Resortrces
II.11.  While it  has not recentLy erupted with quite the violence of
the ttenergy crisistt,  the materials challenge nevertheless amounts to
a major discon[inuity and points to a new era of considerable
instability  and uncertainty.
In a general sense, forecasting in  the materials sector is  more
difftcult  than for energy.  There are many more materials to consider
than there are fuels,  and the technical, marketlng and manufacturlng
ramifications of each can be very complex.  Existing studies and
lnformation are in  some ways less advanced than for  energy.
Europe Plus Thirty will  not be able to move lnto  the construction
of wlde-rangingrintegrative,  longer-term scenarios as rapidly as in  the
case of  the energy sector.  It  will  need more time to validate exlsting
data and forecasts  and to develop small-scale extrapolatory forecasts.
It- should concentrate on the preparation of forecasts of  forward demand
and availability  of industrial  raw materials, taking account of  the
influence of scarcity on price levels,  energy requirements, environmental
needs, and possibly making alternative  scenarios for various substitution
possibilities.  The "materials section" should, at  least at  flrst,  spend
a considerable part of its  time as a listening  post and in contracting
work out to other institutions.  It  will  need 4-5 people.
Chapter 12. The Eavironment
II.12.  The "envlronment" is  a very wide and heterogeneous subject and
includes:  the physical environment, the biosphere, the man-made
environment (urban and land-use planning), and societyrs response to
the challenge of environmental problems.  Europe Plus Thirty must gol9
for fields where there is a clear and practical European Conrnunity
interes t.
The following could be picked out as starting points:  the
economlc and envlronmental effects of alternatlve systems of pollutlon
regulatlon and control, and the management  and protectlon of the marine
envlronment in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Corrnunity countries.
Five people might be needed:
Iand pollution,  and two experts in
p1-annlng.
one expert each in water, air  and
the nascent discipline  of  s€a-us€
Chapter 13. Transport
II.13.  European transport forecasting models cannot be sirnply the sum of
individual national forecasts.  National models are not able to deal
effectively  with international movemenLs: a Cournunity model would provide
the external data needed by national models.  For many purposes, the area
studied will  have to include all  "Western Europe" (including  Yugoslavia,
Greece and Turkey).
Europe Plus Thirty  should concentrate  on long-distance traffic  and
the main-line hauls, i.e.  air  links,  intercity  rail  links,  national and
interregional highways, principal  waterways and ferries.  It  will  have
to work closely with the European Intercity  Transport Study in OECD, and
the inland waterway forecasting undertaken by the U.N. Economic  Conrnission
for  Er,rrope in Geneva.  Europe PIus Ttrirty should include at  least three
people experienced in  transport analysis.
Chapter 14. Conununicatlons
II.14.  Forecasting in  this  field  is not so much a mat,ter of  technological
forecasting as  of  demand forecasting.  Costrnunication  needs wl1I depend
on a host of  factors --  industrial  aird conunercial policies,  data-processing
policles,  cultural  and educational policies,  and the degree of economic,
political  and cultural  integration within  the Cordnunity. The development
of conrnunications will  in  turn affect  all  these.  Forecasting will  be
needed to avoid the recurrence of congestlon and delay which marks our
present systems.  The probable working conditions of  those who wiII
operate future corrnunications systems must be the subject of careful
forecas ting._20
Europe Plus Thirty  should rely  on the services of one or  two
outside correspondents  or part-time members, and seminars shouLd be
organlsed periodicallY.
Chaoter 15. EconomY  and Finance
II.l5.  Many of  the factors which national forecasts have to treat  as
"given" become variables in  forecasting and planning for  the EEC.
Economic  forecasts and studies, however, are rarely based on the
view of  the EEC as an integrated economy, with its  own structural
relations and flows.  It  raill  be useful to construct an EEC
economic matrix and an EEC financial matrix, which could be used,
for  example, to assess the mutual compatibility of national investment
programmes,  and the impact of regional policies.
Perhaps the forecasting of relative  price structures in a new
economic context should be the first  priority.  Other important
questions are:  trends in relative  wages, modes of  international
dlvislon of  labour, centrlpetal  and centrifugal  forces, and the role
of financial  systems and intermediaries.
A team of  10-15 economists would be sufficient  for  these long-
term tasks.  The support of national and Cornmunity statistical  offices
will  be vital.
Chepter 16. Defence and Disarmament
II.16.  The aim here is  certainly not to duplicate the sort of  forecastlng
that NATO does, but it  is  lmpossible to forecast about society in  general
wlthout havi.ng, as inputs, information  relating  to defence.  In particular,
the impact of possible changes in  the military-political  pattern in
Europe and the rest of  the world, and the impact of  defence technology and
expenditure on national economies, are facts,  and major facts,  in  our
potitical  and economic situation.
There should be 3 professionals who are acquainted with defence
and disarmament problems in  the Europe Plus Thirty  team.-2L
Ch4pter I7. Polittcs and Institutions
II.17.  Europe PLus Thlrty  should lnclude at  least three people with
wide political  experlence, because forecastlng ln  this  area ls  a matter
not so much of  techniques as of knowledge about polltical  institutions
and history,  and of practical  experience and mature political  judgement.
Among the tasks of  these people would be to keep the rest of Europe Plus
Thirty  alert  to political  reality,  to assess the impact of  emerging
trends on political  institutions,  when appropriate to devise and compare
alternative  plans for  new institutions,  and to keep an eye on political
deveropments outside Europe.  rn the main Report, chapters l0rllr15r16,
and 17 in  Part II  emphasise especially the indissolubility  of European
and world forecasting,
PART III  :  TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
III.  Technology  Assessment (TA) may be defined as the advance evaluation
of potential  and unintended social,  economic, environmental and other
effects of  the application of existing or foreseen technologies. It
arose out of  the tension between the pursuit of  technology and the
well-being of society;  the idea originated  under this  name in  the U.S.
in  the second half  of  the 1960rs.  The U.S. Office of Technology  Assessment
r"tas set up within  Congress, and all  Federal Agencies now have to include
Environmental  Impact Statements in  their proposals and reports.  TA has
been taken up in Japan, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany,  France
and the Unlted Kingdom.  The pattern of  technology assessment in  the
Western world, and the organisations  doing TA in Cornmunity and certain
neighbouring countries, are described in  the main report.
The specific analytical  techniques used in TA are very much the same
as those used in  forecasting.
TA, if  undertaken at  the level of  the European Conrnunitieq  would
enable the social element to be taken into  account in  the Conrnunitiesl
progress  towards economic cooperation,  and should help to avoid
duplication at  the national level.  Given that the effects of many new
technologies cut across national frontiers,  TA should often be undertaken
in ternational 1y.22
In view of  the strong and clear llnks  between TA and forecastingt
we suggest that Europe Plus Thirty  should be the Communitiesr lnstrument
for TA.  TA impl-ies the examinatlon of  the effects of  technology on the
sectors that will  be within  the competence of Europe Plus Thirty,  and
also the forecasting  of  developments  in  technology itself.  About
seven people within Europe Plus Thirty  should be engaged on TA at  any
one time.
Europe Plus Thirty  should be able to offer  TA services on request
to all  the Comrnunity institutions,  including the European Court of
Justice, and also to the European Investment Bank.
PART IV  :  ETJROPE PLUS THIRTY
The questions
IV.l.  We were asked two questions.  The first  was:  "Should the European
Conrnunities undertake a study entitled  Europe Plus Thirty  concerning the
foreseeable or possible developments  over the next thirty  yeals whlch are
likely  to affect  the progress of Europe; and if  so, will  this  study make
it  possible in particular  to create a forecasting instrument which can
be constantly updated ?"  To this l/e answer yes.  The lnstrument is
described ln  the rest of  this  chapter.
IV.2.  The second question was:  "should the European Conmunitles create
their  own Technology Assessment  Office ....  ?"  To this  we anstter no;
not a separate one.  We think that TA should be carried out by Europe
Plus Thirty.  The ingredientg of  good TA are technological,  socialr  and
economlc forecasting  and analysis, and these will  be going on Ln Europe
PLus Thirty  anyhow.
Terms of Relef
1V.3.  We propose the following terms of  reference for  the continuing
instrument Europe Plus Thirty:  (abbreviated from the main Report)
t)  To provide the European Communities with a comprehenslve  capability
for  long-term forecasting and other ways of  thinking about the
future as a basis for  examining alternative policies  and strategiest
including:a)
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continuous forecastlng related to the Cormnunitlesr  planning
needs;
a scanning, look-out or early warnlng system;
an information  centre;
b)
c)
d) a monltorlng system for  social and
aimed at obtalning a satisfactory
related developments,
data . base.
organisations carrying out To create world-wide links with other
related work.
To carry out relevant research, including methodological  development,
and post hoc policy evaluations.
To carry out studies on request from Cornrnunity institutions,  member
governments, or other appropriate agencies.
To undertake TA.
To undertake these functlons not only on request, but also as the
Board of Europe Plus Thirty  considers necessary.
S truc ture
IV.4.  The work of Europe Plus Thirty  can be divided into  three elements:
the passive network, the active network, and the central team.  The
passlve network means absorbing what goes on elsewhere, reflecting  on
and, as far  as possible, synthesising  the work of others.  In  the
active network, a small central  team would itself  formulate the questions
to be asked, and then corrnissLon studies from exlsting organisations.
Finally,  the central  team would answer some of  the questions and carry
out some of  the research itself,  ttin-housett.
IV.5.  The passive network is  necessary but not sufficient,  for Europe Plus
Thtrty would have no influence on the choice of  the questions and the
angle from which they would be answered.  The active network would not
provide the continuity of experience which would be necessary to adapt
the advice given to the needs of  the recipient.  Moreover, integrated
forecastlng of  its  nature requires an ttin-housett operation.  The active
network approach does not necessarily save money if  one bears in mind the
costs of outside contracts.
IV.6.  I,le think that the right  solution is  a mixture of all  three ways
of working.  In  terns of cost (not man-hours) the proportions might,
when Europe Plus Thirty  is  operating at  full  strength, be:
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)Passive Network:
Active Network:
In-house
Constitution
IV.7.  Any sizeable team of
provide general guidance,
to sift  the demands which
10%
307.
60%
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research workers needs a governing body to
to protect it  from political  attack,  and
may be made on it.
IV.8.  Europe Plus Thirty  should have a Board, whose responsibilities
would be to settle  the broad programme of work a few years ahead, to
decide on the budgetary and staff  allocations for  different  projectst
to approve the contracting out of work, and to screen requests  from
the Cosrnunitv institutions  for work to be done.
IV.9.  The Board should conslst  of  twelve members including the Chairman
and the Director.  Three qualities  should be present among members of
the Council:  knowledge of  forecasting and TA in general, knowledge of
the fields  in which forecasting and TA is  done, and political  experience.
Apart from the Chairman,  who would attend especially to the external
relations of Europe Plus Thirty,  there should be two other members who
are strong in political  experience.  .One Vice-Chairman and two other
members should be strong in  forecasting and TA in general.  The second
Vice-Chairman should have experience of  financial  control.  Of the
remaining four members of ,the Board  (other than the Director),  one
should be strong in  each of  the following areas:
1.  soclal, political,  educational
2.  resourcesr energy and environment
3.  science, technology and industry
4.  economics and finance.
IV.10.  The simplest and most convenient way to appoint the Board would be
for  the Cosunission of  the European Communities to do it,  after  appropriate
soundings.  Naturally, a reasonable balance should be observed among
the nationalities.  The initial  appointments should be for  four years,
but after  the initial  build-up one quarter of  the Board  should be
replaced each year.25
IV.ll.  The Director should be appointed by the Board, who would also have
the power to dismiss him.  He should sit  wlth the Board but have no
vote.  Perhaps with the help of a small personnel cosunittee of  the
Board, the Director should hlre  and fire  staff  members. He should be
asslsted by two Deputy Directors and an Admlnlstrator.
The staff  of Europe Plus Thirty
IV.12.  Although the size of Europe Plus Thirty will  depend on the tasks
assigned to it,  it  is  possible to identify  a minimum viable size and an
upper limit.  A size of  less than 30 professionals  would make it
difficult  to guarantee  good links with existing professional  networks
and to maintain the level of  internal  debate necessary for  useful
output.  Over 100 professionals, control of  the quality  of output
begins to overload the directing  staff.  Our recorunendation  is:
Less than
30- 50:
50- 7 5:
75-100:
Over 100:
probably not worth it.
worth it,  but likely  to lead to rather
sketchy outputs
good
better,  but not all  that much better.
not necessary.
IV.13.  The team needs to be a mixture of specialists and of people who,
while having specialist  knowledge, are also skilled  at organising  the
knowledge of others.  Apart from academics and civil  servants, industry
(management,  research, and trade unions) and financ'e need to be represented.
There should also be part-time staff  and task forces, as we have discussed
in Part II  of  this  report.
IV.14.  Members of  the central  team wll-l need to travel  to find out what is
going on elsewhere.
IV.15.  To avoid stagnation, there should be a measure of continuous staff
turnover, with employment  contracts in general limited  to 4-6 years for
the professional staff,  once the build-up phase is  over.
IV.l6.  Support staff  will  be required at  the rate of  1.5 or 2 per
professlonal.  Periodic turnover will  not be necessary for  them.
IV.17.  Despite the inevitability of professional divisions of some kind
or other, cross-working will  be essential, and work prograntrnes should26
never follow a particularty  tidy pattern;  in  fact  the staff  should be
conceived as a multidisciplinary,  problem-oriented  team.  General
analysis and integration should be the main purpose.
IV.18.  Complete openness  between Europe Plus Thirty and the relevant policy-
makers is the way to prevent it  from becoming an object of suspicion or
a source of embarassment.
PubI ica tion
IV.19.  Given that much of Europe Plus Thirtyrs  output will  be of
considerable interest  to the public and to the scientific  conununityr  we
recommend that publication should be the rule,  but that unpublished studies
should not be excluded if  there is  good reason for non-publication.  The
decision should rest with the Board of Europe Plus Thirty,  after  consultation
with the relevant PolicY-nakers.
Relations with Communitv institutions  and member governments
IV.20.  No matter how good the work of Europe Plus Thirtyr  it  will  be
wasted if  it  is not available to the right  people at  the right  time.
It  will  not be enough for  the written  output of Europe Plus Thirty  to
be available to the decision-makers; there must also be personal
contact.  The contacts should be close and continuous, but not so close
as to deprive Europe Plus Thirty of  the intel"lectual independence whlch
will  be its  justification,  or to prevent it  from getting on with its  job.
IV.21.  The Chairman and Director of Europe Plus Thirty  should have right
of access to the President of  the Cosrnission of  the European Cormnunities
and to individual Cosunissioners,  who should have the reciprocal right  to
send for  the former.  Individual staff  members of Europe Plus Thirty
should have their  olrn contacts with those Cosunission officials  most pearly
concerned with their work.  Mministratively,  Europe Plus Thirty  should
depend from the Commission as a whole.
IV.22.  There should be the same rights  of access between the Chairman of
Europe PIus Thirty  and the President and Secretary General of  the European
Parliament, as between Europe Plus Thirty  and the cormnission.
1V.23,  Relations between Europe Plus Thirty  and the Council of Ministers
should be via  the Conunission.
These relations  should be constantly reviewed in  the light  of possible
future changes.'27
W.24.  The European Court of Justice might in  future wish to ask Europe
Plus Thirty  for certain studies.
IV.25.  It  mlght be useful for member governments each to designate one
officlal  to handle their contacts with Europe Plus Thlrty, and it  would
clearly be useful for these national officials  to meet from time to time
at the premises of Europe Plus Thirty.  Europe Plus Thirty could also
act as a forum of informal discussion among national long-term planners,
Responsibilitv for  Funding
W.26.  The question  who pays for  Europe Plus Thirty  is  bound up with the
question who has the right  to ask it  to undertake work, which we consider
first.
TV.27.  The need for  Eutope Plus Thirty has been expressed specifically  by
the Council and Commission of  the European Communities.  Europe Plus
Thirty  should, first  and foremost, entertain requests for work from the
Conrnission, and the Parliament.  Requests should also be entertained
from member governments, the European Investment Bank, and later  perhaps
from other organisations  and associations at  the European level.  The
Board  of  Furope Plus Thirty  should sift  the requests to ensure an
orderly workload.
IV.28.  We think that Europe Plus Thirty  should never be allowed to depend
for more than a quarter of  its  income on sources other than the Corrnission,
and that the greater part of  that quarter should come from member
governments. Only by the imposition of  such a ceiling  will  it  be possible
to ensure staff  security,  and to avoid both professional and financial
anxieties and dangers.
TV.29.  The money that Europe Plus Thirty  receives from the Conrnission should
come to it  in a quantity negotiated and settled (with an inflation  clause)
for a reasonable number of years, so as to permit the development of
long-term forecasting prograsunes in an atmosphere of confidence.  The
detailed allocation of  the funds should be left  to the Board of Europe
'  Plus Thirty,  to ensure maximum academic and professional independence.
Build-up of Europe Plus Thirtv
IV.30.  TA may be done fairly  quickly, but forecasting work is  long-term
by its  very nature.  It  takes a long time to do it,  and even longer
to judge its  value.  lJe are anxious that Europe Plus Thirty  should be-28
given time to prove its  value, and reconrnend, therefore, that'it  should
be guaranteed a minimum life  of  10 years.  At the end of  this  10 year
programme, the Commission,  the Parliament  and the Council, or whoever
will  then  be the pogrer centres, should assess the achievements and
utility  of Europe Plus Thirty and decide whelher or not to arrange for
a new ten-year progralffne.
IV.31.  The ten-year build-up of Europe Plus Thirty  should be divided into
three phases (see Illustrati.ve  Table).
gH+sE
Preparatory I  Council appointed. Director chosen, lrork /cr I - 2) structure and plan developed, pronises
obtained.
Bulld-up
Undis turbed
Run
2  Staff assuned. Forecasting begins.  High
proportion of trlistening
postrr work. Technology
assessnent, begins. Task forces
organised.
3  Staff assr.nned. First forecasts appear.
First technology  assessmenls
aPPear.
TAs contlnue and appear from
llOld  Oll o
4  Staff  assumed. First  rTeleonomicrf forecast-
ing appearsr Increasing  prop-
ortion  of contract work and in-
house work.
5  Staff  completed.First  forecasts updat.ed.
6  Staff  complete. First. full  teleonom] app€arso
Integrated trteleonomiCt fore-
cast,ing cont,inues. Stable
proportion achieved between in-
house, contract,  and listening
post worko
7  A11 work now fully  integrated and the ildouble
conerr approach fully  exploited.
8  Second teleonomy appears.
9  As Year 7.
10  Third teleonomy appears. Corirnission,  Parlianent
and Council begin to review achievernents  and
utillty  of Europe'F[us Thirty.
11  Revlew conpleted, and decisions taken about future
of Europe Plus Thirty.'29
Cost
W.32.  Assuming a figure  of. 75 professionals, an average number of
supPortlng staff  of  1.5 per professional,  and a reasonable figure for
external contracts, symposia, conferences, etc.,  then the annual cost,
after  the five-year build-trp period, would be 5.5 ntitlion  units of account,
at  1975 prices (see Annex 4 in main Report for  details).
Geographical  Location
IV.33.  We have recommended that Europe Plus Thirty  should have a close
relation with the Corrnission of  the European Conrnunities,  but not too
close.  Europe Plus Thirty  should, therefore, find.premises which are
between one and three hours, door to door, from the offices  of  the
Commission. With less than one hour, people would be dropping in  for
no good reason, both ways.  More than three hours wouLd mean that
every meeting required an overaight stay.